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Abstract 
Behavior in the local commons is usually embedded in a context of regulations and social norms that 
the group of users face. Such norms and rules affect how individuals value material and non-material 
incentives and therefore determine their decision to cooperate or over extract the resources from the 
common-pool. This paper discusses the importance of social norms in shaping behavior in the 
commons through the lens of experiments, and in particular experiments conducted in the field with 
people that usually face these social dilemmas in their daily life. Through a large sample of experimental 
sessions with around one thousand people between villagers and students, I test some hypothesis about 
behavior in the commons when regulations and social norms constrain the choices of people. The 
results suggest that people evaluate several components of the intrinsic and material motivations in 
their decision to cooperate. While responding in the expected direction to a imperfectly monitored fine 
on over extraction, the expected cost of the regulation is not a sufficient explanatory factor for the 
changes in behavior by the participants in the experiments. Even with zero cost of violations, people 
can respond positively to an external regulator that issues a normative statement about a rule that is 
aimed at solving the social dilemma.  
Key words: social norms, regulations, cooperation, collective action, common-pool resources, 
experiemental economics, field experiments. 
JEL Classification: D71, Q0, Q2, C9, H3, H4. 
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NORMAS SOCIALES Y COMPORTAMIENTO EN LOS RECURSOS 
DE USO COMÚN A TRAVÉS DEL LENTE DE LOS 
EXPERIMENTOS EN CAMPO 
 
Resumen 
Las decisiones en los recursos de uso común están usualmente inmersas en un contexto de regulaciones 
y de normas sociales que deben enfrentar los usuarios. Dichas normas y reglas afectan la forma en que 
los individuos valoran los incentivos materiales y no materiales y por tanto determinan su decisión de 
cooperar o sobre explotar los recursos del espacio colectivo. Este artículo discute la importancia de las 
normas sociales en moldear el comportamiento en los recursos de uso común usando el lente de los 
experimentos económicos en campo, y en particular experimentos realizados con personas que 
usualmente enfrentan estos dilemas sociales en su vida cotidiana. A través de una muestra de sesiones 
experimentales con cerca de mil personas entre campesinos y estudiantes, pruebo algunas hipótesis 
sobre el comportamiento en los recursos comunes cuando hay regulaciones y normas sociales que 
restringen las acciones de las personas. Los resultados sugieren que las personas evalúan varios 
componentes de las motivaciones intrínsecas y materiales en sus decisiones de cooperar. Aunque si 
responden en la dirección esperada a multas bajo un monitoreo imperfecto de la sobre explotación, el 
costo esperado de la regulación no es un factor suficiente para explicar la variación en el 
comportamiento de los participantes en los experimentos. Incluso con regulaciones de costo cero de la 
violación, las personas responden positivamente a una regulación externa que envía un mensaje 
normativo acerca de la regla que se ha diseñado para resolver el dilema social. 
 
Palabras clave: normas sociales, regulaciones, cooperación, acción colectiva, recursos de uso común, 
experimentos económicos. 











1.  Introduction. 
The use of a local commons involves the basic dilemma arising from a conflict between the self-interest 
that drives individual extraction of its resources, and the group interest that drives its conservation. The 
documented evidence of so many failures, successes and situations in between invite us to continue 
pursuing this question. In fact, if Hardin’s tragedy of the commons were a successful prediction, the 
World Database on Protected Areas (http://www.wdpa.org) would not include the thousands of 
terrestrial and maritime areas around the globe that deserve to be managed and conserved due to their 
ecological value despite the threats of human pressure to extract their resources. They would be gone 
by now, as the formal solutions Hardin suggested through private or state property emerged much later 
in human history, and with mixed results over their effectiveness. However, Hardin’s prediction also 
warns us that the optimal conservation of the commons does not emerge naturally from the self-
interest of humans. The conflict between self interest and group interest requires precisely the kind of 
institutions that international, national and local organizations promote through markets, states and 
communities, to prevent over exploitation of these local commons. 
Today the vast majority of local commons worth conserving, due to the ecological goods and services 
they provide for human kind, are immersed in a mix of institutions that include imperfect markets, 
weak states and a diverse set of traditional and modern community arrangements that create monetary 
and non-monetary incentives, partially enforced regulations and social norms.  
The role that social norms can play in shaping behavior and institutions has been recognized in many 
domains of social exchange. In general, norms shape preferences and constrain choices. Norms guide 
individual behavior within groups, and trigger intrinsic motivations and pro-social emotions. 
The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the value added by experimental research on common-pool 
resources both in the lab and the field to the understanding of how institutions and behavior interact to 
produce tragedies or successes, and in particular discuss the role of social norms in these outcomes. In 
the first section I will provide a summary of the micro foundations in the problem of the commons 
from the different perspectives contributed by the behavioral sciences. Many of these behavioral 
foundations have been studied in the laboratory through experiments in social dilemmas, reciprocal 
exchange, public goods and common-pool resource experiments. These studies offer now some robust 
patterns about human intentions and actions, but also leave some questions unanswered that will be 
mentioned. The article will then proceed to present a series of experiments that the author has been 
conducted over the last years to focus on the patterns and open questions from this literature. These 
experiments offer some lights regarding the role of social norms in these environmental dilemmas and 
in particular with respect to the interaction of norms with the regulatory settings that the natural world 
implies for the users of local commons. 
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2.  Building the micro foundations of behavior in the commons (Step 1: material 
payoffs maximizers). 
Let me start by laying out a simple model that incorporates some of the key components in the study of 
common-pool resources. In this model there are N players that have a maximum level of effort ei that 
they can allocate to extract resources from a local commons. The incentives are typical of a problem of 
extraction of natural resources when the players face joint access to the pool.  
Individual payoffs increase at a decreasing rate with individual effort due to marginal decreasing returns 
to effort. However, individual payoffs are also affected by group extraction due to the externality from 
aggregate extraction. Typical examples are the degradation of the ecosystem capacity to provide the 
resources, the increase in extraction costs due to longer distances to extract remaining units, or the 
decrease in the natural renewal of the common-pool.  
More formally, if Yi represents income for player i, then , 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿,∑ ￿￿￿ ￿






￿ ￿ 0, and 
￿￿
￿∑￿￿
< 0 .           [ 1 ]  
This structure resembles the main features of many of the available models that are tested through 
experiments, starting with the seminal book by Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994), and the designs 
that such work inspired2.  
Suppose that each of these N players have to decide their level of extraction3 xi ∈ (1,ei), and that the 




a,b>0. On the other hand, the aggregate extraction increases i’s payoffs because of the indirect benefits 
from the local commons. In other words, lower levels of extraction increase the public good benefits 
from conservation. With these two components, the expression for the payoffs of a player i are defined 
as follows: 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿
￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿∑ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿           [ 2 ]  
For n players, and assuming symmetric endowments for all, ei = e, we can rewrite the expression as, 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿
￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿∑ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿           [ 3 ]  
                                                           
2 The experimental design to be presented evolved from the original CPR experiments by Ostorm, Gardner and 
Walker (1994), an experimental model used by the author in the late 1990s (Cardenas et.al 2000; Cardenas, 2003) 
and further discussions with Ernst Fehr who contributed greatly to develop the model used in the present 
research. 
3  We have eliminated in the action set the zero extraction option (xiso = 0) to avoid possible 
conflicts in conducting these experiments in the field. Previous experiments and pre-testing exercises suggest that 
there are strong aversions by villagers towards prohibitions using natural resources which could create strong 
reactions against the game framing. Interior solutions such as used in Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994) and 
Cardenas et.al (2000) are another alternative, but we have decided here to maintain corner solutions for simplicity. 
There are no analytical implications of using such constrained action set of 1 to e units. 5 
 
If player i chooses xi to maximize Yi, the first order conditions that produce the optimal level of 
extraction xinash are 
￿￿￿
￿￿￿




￿ , for xi ∈  [ 1 , e ]            [ 4 ]  
The parameters of the model were chosen so that the experimental design could be easily explained to 
the participants, and constrained to the region of interest, that is, when the social dilemma happens 
because of the conflict between individual and group interests. To maintain the properties of a CPR 
problem we choose the following parameters: e=8, a=60, b=5, and ￿ = 20, yielding the following 
solution: xinash = (a - ￿) / b = 8. That is, every player i player should choose as her Nash best response 
to allocate her maximum endowment of labor into extracting the resource from the CPR. 
To produce the socially efficient outcome, we maximize the aggregate payoffs and calculate the optimal 
level of extraction for the individuals, xiso. That is  
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ∑￿ ￿ ￿ ∑￿￿￿ ￿
￿
￿￿∑￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿∑￿￿        [ 5 ]  
The first order conditions for this problem require that  
￿￿
￿￿￿




￿ , for xi ∈  [ 1 , e ]          [ 6 ]  
For the parameters chosen above, and for a group of n=5 players, such solution would require each 
player to allocate (60-5*20)/5 < 0. Since xi takes only nonnegative values -for purposes of framing in 
the experimental design, we have a corner solution at xiso = 1, i.e. all players should allocate a minimum 
of effort into extraction to produce the socially efficient outcome. Notice, as n decreases, the Nash and 
social optimum solutions converge to the same solution. 
With these parameters and payoff structure we have now a typical CPR problem with the basic 
properties of a social dilemma. The two corner solutions (xiso = 1 and xinash = 8) provide a simple 
setting for an experimental design to be tested in the campus lab and the field lab4. 
The following two panels in Figure 1 illustrate the properties of this model. The graphs are derived 
from a model where player i chooses her extraction level, ￿￿, with 1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 8, and payoffs that follow 
the conditions described above. For a group of five players, the aggregate extraction should follow 
5 ￿ ∑￿￿ ￿ 32. The experimental design used in these experiments involved a payoffs table that we 
provided the players with to make their decision, and included in the appendix A. The working of the 
table is very simple: each player decides her level of extraction by choosing a column from 1 to 8. The 
player will realize her payoffs when the experimenter announces the group extraction and therefore she 
                                                           
4 By “field lab “ I refer to an experimental setting that resembles the same laboratory conditions but where the 
framing, the context and the participants or subjects are not anymore those of a campus but of a field setting 
where participants are familiar with the problem. However, the set of instructions, incentives and control remain 
similar to those in the campus lab. Harrison & List (2004) refer to these also as ‘artefactual field experiments’. 6 
 
can subtract her own extraction from the group to obtain the row in the table. The cell with her level of 
extraction (column) and their extraction (row) will give the player the payoffs for that round. Notice in 
the table and in the figures below that when everyone chooses x=1 the group maximizes payoffs 
whereas at x=8 the group ends at the Nash equilibrium. 
 
Figure 1. Two dimensions of the social dilemma in the commons. 
Both panels in Fig.1 describe the basic monetary conditions for the social dilemma in a common-pool 
resource (CPR) problem. The two benchmarks of interest, a Nash equilibrium and a social optimum are 
shown as circles in the two panels as reference points.  
In the left panel we see the payoffs for the player i as a function of her individual level of extraction 
under two scenarios. One, when all other players choose the cooperative strategy that maximizes the 
group outcome (solid line), and another when all other players choose their Nash strategy of 
maximizing their individual outcome (dotted line). The dotted line is obviously well below the 
cooperative solution as the Nash strategy leads every player towards the tragedy of the commons. The 
perspective of the individual action can be complemented in the right panel, using the (Schelling 1978) 
model of collective action, reversing the direction of the horizontal axis that shows in this case the 
aggregate extraction by the rest of the group extracting the commons. The vertical axis shows the 
payoffs to the ith player if using the cooperative or the Nash strategy. It is clear from both panels that a 
player maximizing her own individual payoffs in a one shot game with N-1 other players should follow 
her Nash strategy and increase her own extraction to the maximum (Xi=8). 
In our parameterized model, at the Nash equilibrium each individual or the group makes about 42% of 
the income had the group reached the social optimum solution. This is the difference between the 
individual payoffs in the Nash and social optimum solution in the left panel. The gap between the two 
lines in the right panel explains why choosing the maximum individual extraction is a dominant 
strategy. Take for instance the payoffs at the Nash equilibrium. There, player i would have to forego 
38% of her income ($320 - $198) if she were to follow the cooperative strategy and allocate 1 unit of 
effort instead of 8. Think at the other extreme, under a cooperative agreement among the five players at 
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If this was a model with predictive power in an experimental setting, we would stop our research 
strategy right here and move on. However, this theoretical prediction explains only a small fraction of 
the data observed in the lab (with college students) or the field lab (with villagers that face these 
situations). In the next section I will describe the experimental design that tests this model and the 
results from around one thousand experimental participants and more than two hundred sessions 
among students and villagers who have participated in a repeated game setting and under different 
institutional treatments. 
3.  Testing the model in the campus lab and the field lab. 
During the years of 2001 and 2002 we were able to visit ten villages in the coastal and Andean regions 
of Colombia and conduct several sessions of CPR experiments using this basic model. Groups of five 
voluntary participants were invited to participate in a session that lasted about two to three hours 
between explanations of the instructions, conducting the experiment and concluding with a short 
survey and payments to participants. Each participant earned in average between one and two day’s 
wages depending on the decisions made. Payments were made in private and individual information 
was kept confidential. 
In each of these sessions the players had to make decisions over 20 rounds in two stages. During the 
first 10 rounds (stage 1) they could not communicate with each other and were not subject to any other 
coordination device imposed by the experimenter or anyone else. During this stage each player had to 
write down her decision in a piece of paper collected by the experimenter who added the extraction of 
the group and announced publicly the group outcome. With the group outcome and the individual 
choice each player could calculate her payoffs in that round. Both choices and payoffs in each round 
were kept confidential. However, players would observe the group behavior and could easily notice if 
their individual extraction deviated below or above the average extraction of the rest in the group. 
During the second stage, which we will explore later, each group was subject to a particular new 
institution that included self-governing mechanisms such as face-to-face communication, or externally 
imposed regulations with high and low fines and subsidies, or regulations that the players could vote on 
to be implemented. 
The first 10 rounds in stage 1 provide baseline data about behavior that we can compare to when 
introducing new rules in round 11 and for the remaining of the session. With data from 219 
experimental sessions and 1,095 participants (230 college students and 865 villagers from Colombia) we 
find that a small fraction of players choose the Nash strategy of the game (Xi=8) in the baseline game 
where the same five players decide over a 10 rounds session under no communication or any other 
coordination device.  
The following histograms (Figure 2) show the frequencies of decisions for the first round (t=1), the 
aggregate for all ten rounds (t=1-10), and the last round (t=10). The overall data set for ten rounds of 
this experiment add up to 10,950 observations, probably the largest available for a singular experimental 
design of a CPR game. 8 
 
Figure 2. Histograms of decisions for baseline treatment, rounds 1 to 10 (stage 1). V=villagers, 
S=students. Sample: 219 sessions, 1,095 participants (865 villagers and 230 college students), 10,950 
observations. 
The patterns of the data shown in Figure 1 offer some first insights for the analysis of behavior in the 
lab. First of all, only a small fraction of people do behave as in the Nash prediction. The closest 
approximation is the case of a quarter of students that in round 10 follow such strategy. Yes, students 
seem to follow an increasing trend of moving towards such prediction but it does not seem to come to 
a full convergence. In fact a subset of 15 sessions of these experiments went all the way to 20 rounds 
under the baseline incentives, and for these the fraction of Nash choices accounted to 46% for students 
and 11.7% for villagers5. If we relax slightly the criterion to evaluate the choices of players considered 
as maximizing their own material payoffs, e.g. by evaluating those with extraction levels of x≥6, we still 
observe that 36.4% of cases for villagers and 53% for students follow these strategies in the game. In 
fact these proportions do not change much if one evaluates them for the very first round or for the 
entire sample. 
The remaining behavior that does not fit the prediction of using the dominant strategy in every round 
(i.e. X=8) deserves an inquiry into the possible motivations that may shape behavior of these 
individuals. Take again the last round of this first stage of the game so that we allow for learning during 
the game. The social optimum choice (x=1) is chosen by 14.1% of villagers and by 6.5% of students. If 
we add the closer choices that are clearly pro-social (e.g. x≤3) we have about 40.3% of villagers and 
20.9% of students deciding such level of extraction. After 9 rounds it should be clear to these people 
that by doing so they are foregoing some extra payoffs by deviating from the Nash strategy and 
towards the group outcome.  
Is there room for social norms to play a role here? We think so. The experimental setting included a 
mild frame about a common-pool resource; the participants were sitting looking at each other; they 
probably had some expectations and knowledge about the previous history of the others in their group 
derived from previous exchanges before the experiment; they probably had implicit common 
understandings of the behavior that is ‘socially desirable’ and ‘individually allowed’ in these cases and 
for such context; and finally they may have some sympathy sentiments towards the others playing with 
them. 
                                                           
5 Moreover, out of the 10,95 participants only 3 villagers and 2 students chose x=8 as their only strategy 
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In the next section I will build these behavioral elements into the analysis and attempt to shed some 
lights to explain why it is so common to observe this behavior in the laboratory, with subject pools of 
students and non-students around the world and within several types of experiments on social 
dilemmas such as PD games, CPRs, voluntary contributions or public goods. 
4.  Richer behavioral micro foundations (Step 2: the role of motivations and social 
norms) 
The new developments in several areas of the analysis of behavior can enrich our challenge of solving 
the puzzles above. In Cardenas (2009) I have outlined some of the relevant areas of research the 
environment and development from the experimental standpoint, and have also reviewed some of the 
more recent and relevant surveys worth mentioning here. Worth mentioning are the recent surveys by 
Sturm & Weimann (2006), Ehmke & Shogren (2009), & Ehmke (forthcoming), and Cardenas & 
Carpenter (2008) covering experimental work regarding the environment and development issues. With 
respect to the environment it is worth also mentioning the review made by Harrison (2006) who looked 
at the literature on laboratory experiments aimed at addressing criticisms related to hypothetical bias in 
the stated and revealed preferences of approaches that emphasize environmental valuation. Murphy & 
Stevens (2004) likewise evaluated the use of experiments to correct problems of hypothetical bias in 
contingent valuation studies. List & Gallet (2001) address the issue of hypothetical versus experimental 
valuations of environmental goods, showing an increase in the use of experimental methods for 
studying environmental and resource economics questions. A handbook chapter by Shogren (2005), 
shows the challenges for environmental valuation including tests of rationality in environmental 
choices, the problem of estimating the value of environmental goods, and the challenge of designing 
incentives dependent on the elicitation method. As noted by Shogren (2005), since the 1980s, several 
authors had already begun began calling attention to experimentation as something complementary to 
nonmarket valuation exercises, such as which were fashionable at the time. As for natural resource 
management, Ostrom (2006) surveyed the value of conducting laboratory and field experiments for the 
study of common-pool resource problems.  
Many of the studies surveyed in these works identify a series of anomalies or deviations from the 
conventional game theoretical prediction of a self-oriented material payoffs maximizer with perfect 
information and calculations capacity. Among the most relevant patterns of behavior or domains of 
relevant phenomena for environmental and resource issues are the following: 
•  Contributions to Public Goods: See Alpizar et.al (2008a, 2008b); Barr (2003); Carpenter & Seki 
(2006); Carpenter et.al (2004); Falk et.al (2002) Gaechter et.al (2004); Gaechter and Hermman 
(2006); Herrmann et.al (2008); Ibañez & Carlsson (2009); Osés-Erasoa & Viladrich-Grau 
(2007); Rondeau et.al (2005). 
•  Cooperative behavior in Common-pool resources: Cardenas et.al (2000, 2002, 2005); Cardenas 
(2003, 2004); Cardenas & Ostrom (2004); Lopez et.al (2009); Velez et.al (2006); Ostrom et.al 
1994; Rodriguez et.al (2006) 
•  Disparities between WTP/WTA in valuing environmental benefits: See List & Gallet (2001); 
Knetsch & Sinden (1984); Knetsch (1989): Harrison (2006); Shogren (2005); Sturm & 
Weimann (2006). 
•  Ecological or environmental intrinsic values: See Boyce et.al (1992); Caseya et.al (2008); Jack 
et.al (2008); Marette et.al (2008); Sandua et.al (2008). 10 
 
Although this literature enriches the narrow homo-economicus model by bringing up evidence rejecting 
its main predictions, and by offering new theoretical pieces that could serve as basis for a better model 
of behavior, the integration of all these phenomena into one singular model is still missing.  
Folmer (2009) evaluates the contributions of psychology, micro-economics and micro-sociology, and 
within economics he evaluates the contributions that the neoclassical, neo-institutional and behavioral 
economics approaches have brought to this challenge. He, however, is rather skeptical that the solution 
to explaining these anomalies or regularities in economic behavior is going to come from the discipline 
or any of these three paradigms. Instead, he calls for the use of a social rationality model, inspired by 
sociology, psychology and anthropology where bounded actions and social influences play a central role 
in choice and in a more integral manner. Folmer argues that the fragmentation of factors in the analysis 
of rationality may create risks of not getting the whole picture right. For instance, the interactions 
between material payoffs and intrinsic motivations might be missed if only the latter are taken into 
account when explaining why people decide to trust others. 
In an attempt to combine the different levels of motivations, incentives and constraints from formal 
and non-formal institutions, Cardenas and Ostrom (2004) present a model of simultaneous layers that 
influence choice and transform the payoffs structure of a material incentives game into a subjective 
payoffs game that guides the final choice to cooperate or not in a social dilemma. The model developed 
there was influenced by the work that Ostrom (1998) had been proposing for a behavioral model of 
rational action in the problem of collective action. The layers include the material payoffs of the game 
and its basic conditions such as being a one-shot or a repeated game; the regulations that bind actions 
based on a level of enforcement; and also other layers of the game where the identity of the individual 
(e.g. her own moral norms) and group norms in which the game is being played interact with the 
material payoffs game, altering the weight that the incentives to free-ride have against the incentives to 
cooperate. In this framework, players go back and forth across these layers finding the relevant 
information from regulations, norms, biases, and material incentives until they find their best response 
in terms of subjective payoffs. The model is reprinted in Figure 3 below. This model was tested 
econometrically with a set of CPR experiments in the field, showing that a fraction of the variation in 
behavior can be explained by these individual and group based factors that the participants brought 




Figure 3. Layers of information that transform the material payoffs of a social dilemma. From Cardenas 
& Ostrom (2004). 
With a similar flavor, Folmer (2009) brings the attention to the RREEMM model by Lindenberg, 
heavily influence by psychology. In such model both substantive and operational goals work as 
motivators for action, but the processing of information is subject to constraints in the capacity of 
processing data, and subject to trial and error algorithms with stopping rules that guide choices. Within 
this kind of framework individuals may not choose the optimal solution that the perfect data processing 
homo-economicus might be able to choose. Here the heuristics, the social norms and the limited 
capacity of data processing may bring players to other equilibria that may suffice for the substantive and 
operational goals of the individual but that might be sub-optimal if compared to the solution offered by 
the perfectly rational homo-economicus. 
In all these new developments that responded to the narrow scope of the homo-economicus model, 
norms play a very prominent role. Elster (1989) creates a distinction between social norms and moral 
norms worth mentioning. In the case of former, he argues that a norm, to be social, needs to be shared 
by others and needs to be at least partially maintained through the approval or disapproval of those 
same people. Also, Elster argues that social norms are usually sustained through social emotions such 
as shame, guilt, or embarrassment. This author defines norm as “the propensity to feel shame and to anticipate 
sanctions by others at the thought of behaving in a certain, forbidden way” (page 105). When this propensity is 
shared with other people, it becomes a social norm. (Young 2008) defines social norms as “customary 
rules of behaviour that coordinate our interactions with others”. In his definition the idea that each player expects 
others to follow that particular way of acting is crucial to the emergence of norms as useful mechanisms 
for inducing cooperative behavior within a group that, as in our case, face a social dilemma. 12 
 
Norms in general create two kinds of effects on individual behavior, they can limit choices and they can 
shape preferences (Baland & Platteau, 1996). In the first case, there are ways in which norms can limit 
the choices of players. For instance, recalling the principle of reciprocity by Sugden (1984), Baland & 
Platteau (1996) show how a social dilemma can be turned into a multiple coordinating equilibria game if 
players follow the reciprocal norm of “not free-riding when others are cooperating”. If all players 
follow such norm, the game can produce many equilibria away from the zero cooperation solution, 
including the social optimum one. When norms shape preferences or expectations, several possibilities 
can emerge for the solution to the cooperation problem. The first one to be considered is that 
individuals derive utility from the improvements of well-being of others due to altruistic or cooperating 
actions. If the gift given to others yields enough utility that compensates the cost of the gift, such action 
might be a rational one. Next in line is a more complex possibility of transforming the utility function 
using the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) where individuals have a combination 
of utility from own payoffs, and disutilities from an advantageous inequality (guilt) and a 
disadvantageous inequality (envy) from the allocation of outcomes in the game. For the particular case 
of common pool resources Falk et.al (2002) test this model against experimental data from CPR games 
shedding some lights on how relative payoffs play an important role in pro-social behavior. For a more 
general treatment of these models see chapter 3 in Bowles (2004). 
Finally, it could be useful to also mention the typology that Ostrom (2005) offers for her grammar of 
institutions (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). Any institution, she argues, includes a syntax of five 
components (Attributes, Deontic, Aim, Conditions and OrElse). The Attributes describe who the 
institution applies to; the Deontic describes the “may, must and must not” conditions of the institution; 
the Aim describes the conditions of actions or outcomes to which the Deontic applies; the Conditions 
describe when an action is permitted, obligatory or forbidden; and the Or Else component assigns 
consequences to those not following the ruling. Using this syntax, Ostrom identifies “Rules” as those 
including the complete set of ADICO conditions above. If the institution lacks the Or Else condition 
we would have “Norms” (with the ADIC syntax). Finally, if the institution only includes the AIC 
components, Ostrom includes them in the category of “shared strategies”. 
The reason for bringing this typology her is that it can enhance the analysis of norms by including the 
possibility of regulations that states or communities may have formalized into formal institutions. The 
vast majority of the local commons in the world today most likely include a combination of formal and 
informal institutions and therefore the interaction between norms, rules and shared strategies becomes 
essential. 
Thanks to these institutional and behavioral factors that shape preferences, norms and limit actions, 
humans have been able to evolve the capacity to cooperate in social dilemmas. The ethnographic 
evidence compiled by Ostrom (1990) for the case of common-pool resources, and also documented by 
Baland & Platteau (1996) or Wade (1994) suggests that humans have been able to sustain a set of 
institutions that have harmonized individual and group interests in the use of natural resources. A 
theoretical work by Sethi & Somanathan (1996) from evolutionary game theory shows that norms can 
emerge in groups that share a common-pool resource via restraint and punishment by group members. 
Their model includes three types of players: defectors, enforcers who sanction defectors, and 
cooperators who do not sanction. Other theoretical works (Axelrod, 1981; Taylor, 1987) have shown 
that cooperation can emerge among selfish individuals if the right conditions for repetition in the game, 
low discounting of time and strategies such as the “nice tit-for-tat” emerge. Nowak (2006) provides 13 
 
probably the best summary of the five rules of cooperation that have been identified in nature and in 
humans, starting with the reciprocal altruism by Trivers (1971), and the strategies of direct, indirect and 
network reciprocities, to finally, group selection. The role that social preferences play in these models is 
important, as they allow players to care about the others and be able to sacrifice individual well-being 
on behalf of the group or some group members. Further, the inclusion of other-regarding preferences 
has been argued as critical for the study of ecological behavior (Gintis, 2000). 
Van Lange et.al (2007) offer a more comprehensive account of the inter-personal orientations from 
social psychology that ultimately welcome both the self-oriented as well as the other-regarding 
preferences into one. In their approach players’ have social orientations that are based on the individual 
and relative payoffs. He proposes five dimensions of interpersonal orientations: 1. Altruism: where an 
individual enhances the outcomes of others; 2. Prosocial orientation: where individuals enhance joint 
outcomes (cooperation) or the equality of outcomes (egalitarianism); 3. Individualism: enhancing the 
outcomes to self; 4. Competition: enhancing the relative outcomes in favor of self; and 5. Aggression: 
aiming at reducing the outcomes for other. The canonical model of homo-economicus would only 
focus on 3. But the evidence of consistent rational behavior in controlled experiments towards the 
other types is reported in Van Lange’s work and others (See Barr et.al 2009 for a recent cross-cultural 
study using three bargaining games to test the consistency of a model of inequality aversion). 
In summary, much of the literature that has contributed to move beyond the model of homo-
economicus with new elements of bounded rationality, other-regarding preferences and the capacity to 
follow norms can now be grouped to offer insights for a model of social rationality as suggested by 
Folmer (2009). There are four key elements that are complementary and of use in our analysis of 
behavior in the commons: 
•  Self-regarding preferences: Individuals care about their material well-being and choose 
alternatives of action that increase their material payoffs. In the commons, extracting resources 
form the commons increases income and other sources of well-being. 
•  Other-regarding preferences: Individuals care about the payoffs of themselves relative to the 
payoffs of others in the group of reference. In the commons players may refrain themselves 
f r o m  e x t r a c t i n g  o n e  m o r e  u n i t  s o  t h a t  i s  l e ft available for others. These other-regarding 
preferences include at least the following two options: 
o  Altruism: Individuals are capable of foregoing personal material well-being to increase 
that of others through gifts. 
o  Inequity aversion: Individuals dislike unfair outcomes in both directions, that is, in 
their favor (guilt) or in favor of others (envy), probably with larger disutility for the 
latter. 
•  Ecological preferences: Individuals place an intrinsic value on the existence of the 
environment or an ecosystem, including its components and flows. 
•  Norms: Individuals are capable to follow commonly shared norms that may reduce their 
material individual well-being.  
There are other relevant elements of behavior that could play a role here (CARDENAS and 
CARPENTER 2008) but are left aside for the analysis that follows. I have already mentioned the 
applications of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky) and the endowment or loss aversion effects to 
environmental outcomes (Knetsch 1989). Other of the important effects include preferences over risk 14 
 
and over time that can shape inter-temporal decisions or decisions under uncertainty. The experimental 
design reported here, however, does not have the inter-temporal dimension and therefore is not 
included as an explanatory factor in the analysis of the observed data. 
5.  Explaining an interior equilibrium in the CPR experiment. 
It has been shown in figure 2 that the group and individual behaviors of these experiments seem to 
move towards an interior point where some players choose the Nash strategy, others the cooperative 
strategy and others choose in between. As groups, the level of extraction does not move towards the 
full exhaustion of the resource, neither towards the socially optimum. Figure C.1 in the appendix shows 
a box plot graph for both subject pools suggesting that there is no clear trend towards any particular 
benchmark. The patterns are also statistically different6 between students and villagers and therefore 
deserve a discussion of the plausible reasons. 
Let us come back to the basic model pictured in Fig.1 and use a snapshot of the average choice 
observed in the lab, and what the individual and group incentives are like at one particular point. 
Suppose a particular player and her group are located at the average behavior observed in these 
experiments of 4 units of individual extraction and thus 20 units for the group. At this point a particular 
player can make $518 if she chooses x=1 or $640 if she chooses her Nash strategy (x=8), as one can see 
in Figure 1 or the payoffs table in the appendix. For any particular level of group extraction the Nash 
choice will give this player around $122 monetary units above the cooperative strategy. This is the gap 
between the maximum and minimum levels shown in the left panel of Fig.1. These incentives however 
have to be contrasted with those shown in the right panel where the externalities to others are better 
depicted. Notice that every effort by one individual to move to the left (cooperate) increases the 
payoffs of both the Nash and Cooperative players. This is represented by the φ factor in equations [2] 
and [3], by the slope of the two curves in the right panel of Fig.1, and in the payoffs table in Appendix 
A. A reduction of one unit of extraction by one player increases the payoffs of each other player by 
φ=$20 in our model. If player i moves to the left one step she is foregoing her personal income by 
some amount but is improving the outcome of the other four players by moving them on row up in the 
table, i.e. increasing everyone’s earnings by $20. Every column to the left decreases one’s payoffs by 
some amount that is marginally increasing when moving from the dominant strategy to the social 
optimum. For instance, moving from x=8 to x=7 means foregoing only $2, whereas moving from x=2 
to x=1 implies foregoing $32. At around the average level of extraction, moving from x=4 to x=3 each 
individual foregoes $22 but increases everyone’s payoffs by $20. Rings a bell?.  
Foregoing the income not earned by playing the Nash strategy may bring other impacts over the 
individual and group outcome that may justify its cost. The first one is that reducing one’s extraction 
increases the public good component of the commons which affects also the others in the group. This 
is clear from the framing and from the payoff table structure. In that sense, moving from the high 
extraction to the low extraction level the player is providing a gift to the others in the group. To be 
more concrete, every unit that is not extracted provides a gift of $80 to the group.  
                                                           
6 A Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test of differences in the group extraction across the two 
samples yields a z-value of -27.756 and a p-value=0.0000. Also, a non-parametric test for the equality of medians 
yields a p-value=0.000 for both individual and group extraction. 15 
 
Our candidates from the models based on other-regarding preferences are altruism, inequity aversion 
and cooperation. By refraining from extracting one unit above the group average the individual is 
providing a public good to the group. Also, such choice helps equalizing the relative payoffs towards 
more equal distribution of effort and outcomes. In other words, free-riding or overextracting has the 
effect of creating more distance between the free-rider and the group, except of course when everybody 
free-rides. 
On the other hand, by reducing extraction each player is also signaling that she is willing to forego 
income in order to contribute to the group outcome, which in turn can be interpreted by the group as a 
player that is willing to work towards a group oriented strategy which should bring everybody up to the 
social optimum. This signal can work in the direction that Sugden’s norm of reciprocity that ‘nobody 
should free-ride if the rest are cooperating’. 
However, these processes would work just up to the point, otherwise a group under these motivations 
and mechanisms should move all the way towards the social optimum and we would be observing an 
assurance game or a coordination game rather than a social dilemma or a public goods, CPR or any n-
prisoners’ dilemma game.  
So, the we can infer that some of these preferences and norms may be playing a role in the shift from 
the Nash equilibrium of zero-cooperation towards the intermediate point we observe in the vast sample 
of the commons experiment for both students and villagers. 
Can groups shift further up in terms of social efficiency? The answer is yes. The next step in our 
analysis is to test the role of external and endogenous mechanisms that can be brought to the 
experiment and see their effectiveness in inducing individual behavior that is more group oriented. 
6.  Norms and Rules in the lab. 
As mentioned before, the experiments conducted in this large sample included all a second stage of 
rounds (t=11-20) where participants faced a new institution that was aimed at solving the collective 
action problem. A sub-sample of the experiments we call “Baseline” were conducted under the same 
conditions of the first ten rounds, that is, players were told that they would play for another ten rounds 
under the exact same conditions where players made their decisions individually and privately, without 
communication or any other coordination device and with only the group outcome announced in every 
round.  
The next set of sessions that I will label “Self-Governance” included the possibility of face-to-face 
communication among the five players in that session. Here we have two variations: one-shot 
communication and repeated communication. In the former, only for one time the group was allowed 
to talk for five minutes after which they had to sit and make their decisions for the remaining ten 
rounds. In the latter, the communication was allowed for five minutes in every round before the 
decision was made. 
A third subset of sessions is grouped as “External Regulations”. In these sessions we introduced a 
new rule aimed at achieving the goal of the social optimum that maximized the payoffs of the group. In 
each of these we explicitly told the participants the following: 16 
 
“You may have noticed that if each player in the group chooses a level of extraction 
of 1 unit the group makes the maximum possible of points. With this rule we will 
try that the group earns the maximum possible. We will try with this rule that 
each player in your group chooses a LEVEL OF EXTRACTION of 1 unit.” 
After this paragraph we continued explaining the particular condition of the regulation. For some the 
violation of the rule implied a sanction with a certain probability of monitoring and enforcement. For 
others it did not imply a material sanction but a public announcement of the individual action made by 
the player. And for others it implied a subsidy for the inspected player if in compliance. However, we 
will focus on three cases that offer some insights into the role of rules and norms on behavior. The 
three cases will be when there was no fine to violators, a low fine, and a high fine. We will contrast this 
case with the cases where players were allowed to have a face-to-face conversation during the game. 
Theoretical prediction of a homo-economicus model of behavior under regulation. 
Let us first provide a benchmark game theoretical solution to the problem in the case of a player that 
maximizes material payoffs. See Cardenas (2004) for details on this experimental design and modeling, 
and Cardenas et.al 2000 for the first field experiment with an external regulation being tested. First of 
all we will assume that as in reality the regulator has limited resources for enforcement and therefore 
has a partial capacity to monitor and sanction violators of a norm. 
The challenge for an external regulator is to design an instrument that induces an individual behavior 
across players that produces the social optimum. However, a more realistic regulatory setting will 
involve a level of incomplete monitoring and therefore private information by the local users given that 
regulators face a costly enforcement of the instrument. Using the model developed in equations [1] 
through [6] we can integrate the regulatory component for the case of a monetary consequence of 
violating the rule of the socially optimum solution, that is, when x=1. For this we introduce a regulation 
in the form of a fine f, with certain probability p of inspection, to individual levels of extraction that are 
above the social optimal solution, that is when x>1. Such regulation imposes an expected cost to the 
user, which he may balance against the certain benefit of over-extraction. These regulations can take 
many forms in the field7, mostly through state governance systems of different types and levels, but in 
most cases involving a cost imposed to the resource user and a probability of monitoring and 
enforcement. In particular, equation [2] includes now the new expected payoffs function for a player i 
as follows: 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿
￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿∑ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿       [7] 




 ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿￿  ￿  0, generating for the symmetric case a new Nash strategy for 




￿ , for xi ∈  [1,e]       [8] 
                                                           
7 These costs of non-compliance include fine for over extraction, confiscation of equipment (e.g. chain 
saw, traps, boat engines, fishing nets), or prohibition of extraction for a certain period of time. 17 
 
As the fine or the probability of enforcement increase, the player should reduce her extraction. A 
regulator may then combine the product (p*f) to optimize his resource constraints or to comply with 
legal constraints about the maximum fine allowed. 
The trivial case of a zero fine or a zero probability of inspection yields the exact same Nash solution to 
the game shown in equation [4]. Once these two parameters are nonzero, the expected costs will affect 
the Nash strategy of the player 
In our field experiments we tested three different values for the fine $0, $50 and $175. It easy for the 
reader to verify that if we set p=0.2, a fine f=50 will a player to shift her Nash strategy from x=8 to 
x=6 units, whereas a fine of $175 (also under p=0.2) would induce a Nash strategy that is equivalent to 
the social optimum solution. On the other hand, the benchmark to compare the face-to-face 
communication against is the “cheap talk” hypothesis that predicts no effect of any non-binding 
promise to cooperate since the decisions remain private and confidential. However, we know from a 
vast literature from social psychology and political science that communication does have a very strong 
effect on cooperative behavior (See chapter 7 in Ostrom et.al 1994 for a survey of such literature) 
In the next figure 5 we graph the frequencies of decisions in the range from 1 to 8 units of extraction 
for all rounds in the second stage, and for the five institutions we want to compare to: 
•  CX: One-shot communication. The group can have, only once, a five minutes face-to-face 
communication before they start making their ten decisions. 
•  CX-t: Repeated communication. The group can have a five minutes conversation before 
each round. 
•  XRH: High fine. In each round one player is chosen randomly and if violating the rule (x=1) 
she pays $175 per unit of extraction above 1. 
•  XRL: Low fine. In each round one player is chosen randomly and if violating the rule (x=1) 
she pays $50 per unit of extraction above 1. 
•  XnoR: No Fine and Public announcement. In each round one player is chosen randomly 
and if violating the rule (x=1) she pays no fine and must show the monitor her extraction level 
which will be announced publicly to the group. 
 
For purposes of simplification we have merged the students and villagers’ data for the second stage 
without major effects on the analysis and results that follow8.  
Several results are of major importance here. First of all, all treatments have a positive effect on 
cooperation. The fraction of players following the social optimum strategy increases substantially if 
compared to the baseline data described in Figure 2. The two most effective institutions, with almost 
identical distributions are the repeated communication (CX-t) and the high fine (XRH). The cases of 
one-shot communication (CX) and the low fine (XRL) rate in a second place with similar results, and 
                                                           
8 The patterns across the two subject pools in the second stage are quite similar for the sessions under these 
treatments. A Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test yields a p-value=0.4216 for the individual 
extraction levels (n=4,200 observations). The test for differences in the median also shows no statistical 
difference. 18 
 
finally the zero fine + public announcement case (XnoR) which shows also some degree of 
effectiveness by also shifting players towards lower levels of extraction.  
 
 
Figure 4. Histograms of decisions for different institutions, rounds 11 to 20 (stage 2).  
 
In previous papers we have analyzed in further detail some of the comparisons within some of these 
treatments. Cardenas, Ahn & Ostrom (2004) discuss the differences between one-shot and repeated 
communication and how these self-governing mechanisms create norms that induce cooperation in the 
laboratory. The analysis –not shown here for space considerations- show that over time (rounds) the 
two communication institutions start with a strong cooperative behavior but the fraction of players 
choosing the optimal solution decreases over time in the one-shot communication case. We argue that 
the repeated communication serves the purpose of not only clarifying the solution among the players9, 
that is, it helps to build a convention or coordination agreement regarding behavior, according to the 
definition by Young (2008) provided before; but the repeated communication setting also provides the 
other element that seems to operate for social norms, namely, the emotional component (Elster, 1989; 
Sethi & Somanathan, 1996) of inducing the non-material incentives (e.g. guilt and shame) among the 
players through the evaluative routine of discussing over the results of the previous rounds.  
Let us turn now to the next three institutions in the right of Figure 4. As the model predicted, the level 
of cooperation increases with the expected cost ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿, but the data does not match exactly 
with the prediction of the Nash equilibrium. Notice, about half of people are extracting “too much” 
under the high fine (XRH) and “too many” people are extracting much less than they should in the low 
fine (XRL). Further, too many people are refraining to extract in the No-fine and public announcement 
rule (XnoR). Notice that the regulated cases (XRH and XRL), individual and group extraction did 
decrease and earnings went up significantly. However, the difference between the high and low fines is 
rather small in terms of observed behavior. In both cases a large fraction of players shifted their actions 
towards the behavior mandated by the norm, namely, x=1. Between 40 and 50% of decisions matched 
the prescription of x=1 unit of extraction. A median test across the two types of regulations suggests 
                                                           
9 Notice, in the face-to-face communication treatments the experimenter does not provide the optimal solution to 
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that there was no major difference between the two mechanisms for round t=11 right after the 
regulation was imposed. Further, the difference in behavior did not change or diverge across the two 
levels of fines over time. 
Given that all three institutions do have a previous stage of our baseline treatment (Figure 2), we can 
attribute these differences in behavior to the regulatory institution. However, the data may suggest that 
the effect of a change in the material incentives is interacting with the non-material incentives created 
also by the introduction of these institutions. The normative role that the experimenter plays as yet 
another external authority in the experiment is part of the explanation. Secondly, the introduction of 
the regulation does include a normative component of explicitly mentioning that it is aimed at 
maximizing the group outcome. From the stand point of the expected cost of the regulation, in a 
Beckerian world, this introduction of the external regulation brings a change in relative prices and 
therefore a change in behavior. The regulation may change also the relative opportunity cost of 
cooperating by enhancing certain elements of the social preferences of the players. It is just an 
extension of (North 1990), institutions change relative prices, including the “prices” associated with 
emotions or other-regarding preferences. 
In two papers that use part of these data Cardenas (2004) and Rodriguez et.al (2008) we discuss the 
cases of low vs high fines (XRH and XRL) against two other possibilities where players could vote for 
the implementation of these regulations. In those studies we compare the behavior of the cases when 
the regulation was passed and those where it did not. Among the more striking results of those 
experiments is that the behavior of individuals who rejected the regulation and preferred to continue 
playing under the baseline setting –without any monitoring and fining was however as cooperative in 
the first rounds after t=11. Then other mechanisms entered into action (e.g. reciprocity) and 
cooperation decreased over rounds but still those who rejected the monetary component of the 
regulation seemed to have internalized its normative element that shaped the emergence of a social 
norm to guide their behavior.  
The model proposed in Rodriguez et.al (2008) which also uses a simulation exercise to replicate these 
experiments, includes three types of players with different preferences (Selfish, Conditional Cooperator 
and Unconditional Cooperator). The argument there is that the introduction of even weak regulations, 
with the right balance of social preferences and mix of types of players can change preferences and 
induce behavior that is more cooperative that a model where all players act as selfish or homo-
economicus.  
The natural world does have a setting for common-pool resource users where both external regulations 
that alter relative prices and social norms that affect the non-material incentives coexist. This is the 
approach in the model of layers of information described in Figure 3. A commons user will switch back 
and forth between the layer of the material payoffs, estimate a rational best response based on the 
incentives and expected costs of the regulation, but she will also go to the layer of information that 
alters the non-material payoffs because of intrinsic motivations or the social emotions exercised by 
others in the group that share the same social norms. At the end the player will transform the payoffs 
obtained in the material payoffs layer into subjective values and eventually will see the problem not 
anymore as a social dilemma but as an assurance game (Baland & Platteau, 1996). Other players may 
give less weights to those subjective payoffs and continue to see the game as a cooperation problem. 
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7.  Final remarks: the value added of doing experiments in the campus lab and the 
field lab. 
We have reported here a set of experiments that combine two elements that are common in the natural 
world of commons users: social norms that shape behavior and external regulations that shape relative 
prices. Separating these two components that usually interact in the world of the commons, thanks to 
laboratory experiments can help us test alternative theories of behavior that seem to respond to 
different incentives, some of which may be material and others non-material, due to intrinsic 
motivations. Nevertheless, the results reported here also suggest that even if we try in the lab to isolate 
one single mechanism (e.g. a regulation that imposes a fine on over-extraction, with a partial level of 
monitoring) individuals will anyway bring to the lab their own subjective valuation of such mechanism 
and combine it to enrich their decision making in ways that cannot be explained only through a simple 
model of a rational maximize of the short-run material payoffs to self. 
These experiments confirm that individuals do pay attention to the changes in the relative prices of 
cooperation and over extraction in the commons, but that they are willing to forego material payoffs 
from a Nash strategy to satisfy the need to comply with social norms. These social norms sometimes 
come from external regulators, other from the own group. 
By doing these controlled experiments in the field we also enrich the possibility that the actual context 
of the participants be part of the game and therefore we learn more about the interactions between the 
social norms that are built before the experiment and what happens during the experiment. One 
example can be seen in Cardenas (2003) where the actual social distance among the experimental 
subjects measured by the differences in the real wealth they had in the village explained the willingness 
to cooperate in the experiment during similar common-pool resource games. 
The external validity controversy will now extend to the argument above. In the same manner that we 
need to continue exploring the degree to which people in a controlled experiment will respond similarly 
to the incentives and institutional changes in the natural world, we will have to test also that the 
interactions between norms and rules that we observe in the lab will also replicate outside. This will 
require more creativity in maintaining control and at the same time enrich the experimental designs we 
test (Cardenas, 2009). Doing so in the field lab will be complementary to testing some of these 
hypotheses in the campus lab with students.  
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Appendix A. Payoffs table. 
    My level of extraction   
  Their 





















4  758  790  818 840 858 870 878 880  1 
5  738  770  798 820 838 850 858 860  1 
6  718  750  778 800 818 830 838 840  2 
7  698  730  758 780 798 810 818 820  2 
8  678  710  738 760 778 790 798 800  2 
9  658  690  718 740 758 770 778 780  2 
10  638  670  698 720 738 750 758 760  3 
11  618  650  678 700 718 730 738 740  3 
12  598  630  658 680 698 710 718 720  3 
13  578  610  638 660 678 690 698 700  3 
14  558  590  618 640 658 670 678 680  4 
15  538  570  598 620 638 650 658 660  4 
16  518  550  578 600 618 630 638 640  4 
17  498  530  558 580 598 610 618 620  4 
18  478  510  538 560 578 590 598 600  5 
19  458  490  518 540 558 570 578 580  5 
20  438  470  498 520 538 550 558 560  5 
21  418  450  478 500 518 530 538 540  5 
22  398  430  458 480 498 510 518 520  6 
23  378  410  438 460 478 490 498 500  6 
24  358  390  418 440 458 470 478 480  6 
25  338  370  398 420 438 450 458 460  6 
26  318  350  378 400 418 430 438 440  7 
27  298  330  358 380 398 410 418 420  7 
28  278  310  338 360 378 390 398 400  7 
29  258  290  318 340 358 370 378 380  7 
30  238  270  298 320 338 350 358 360  8 
31  218  250  278 300 318 330 338 340  8 
32  198  230  258 280 298 310 318 320  8 
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Appendix B. Experimental protocol summary. 
The following stages were conducted for each of the sessions or groups. 
Pre-game stage (instructions and practice rounds): 
Each of the experiments begins with the reading of the instructions to the group of five players, and 
the handing out of the following forms (available from author): the GAME CARDS where they write 
their choice, i.e her extraction level, in each round; the DECISIONS RECORDS SHEET where they 
keep record of their choices and earnings; and the PAYOFF TABLE (see appendix). Once all questions 
from participants are clarified, the experimenter continues by conducting one round as an example, and 
at least one more practice round. After solving questions, stage 1 begins. 
Stage 1 (Rounds 1-10): 
In stage 1 of the experiment each of the players must decide privately the individual level of extraction 
from the commons, and write it down in one yellow round card; the same information is also recorded 
in the blue records sheet. The monitor collects the 5 cards, adds the total extraction for the group 
which he writes in the monitor’s record sheet, and announces publicly such total. Each player must 
write the group’s total, and by subtracting her individual extraction, she is able to calculate the payoffs 
for that round. She writes her total gains for the round and the experiment proceeds to the next round 
by filling a new round card. It was common information that round 10 was the final under such rules. 
Once they had finished calculating their earnings for round 10, they were told that the rules of the 
exercise were going to change for stage 2 of the game. Also, they were never told in advance what the 
rules for the second stage were. 
Stage 2 (New rule, Rounds 11-20): 
The second stage started by announcing that they will be playing for another 10 rounds under a new set 
of rules. 
For the case of the face-to-face communication we started stage 2 by saying to the participants that in 
every round, and before they made their decisions, they would be allowed to have a 3-5 minutes 
discussion on anything they wanted about the development of the game and that no arrangements were 
allowed to redistribute earnings once the experiment had ended. However, they were told, decisions 
remained individual and confidential. 
For the groups under the regulation treatments, the second stage started by the monitor explaining how 
they probably had noticed that the group could earn the maximum of points if every player chose a 
level of extraction equals to one unit (this information was not given to the communication groups 
though)10. They were also told that for achieving such goal the monitor would choose randomly in 
every round one player and would verify her compliance with the stated rule. Had the player chosen a 
higher level of extraction, she would see her earnings reduced in $50 ($175 for the high penalty 
treatment) times the units of extraction above 1. For the case of no fine, the monitor would announce 
publicly the extraction level of the randomly chosen player, and continue to the next round. 
We also had control groups under a baseline treatment with no change in the rules for the second stage. 
                                                           
10 The reason for announcing this is to make sure that the players have a benchmark to compare to 
when facing a penalty if chosen for the inspection, and that the external policy is common knowledge. It was very 
clear in many sessions that by round 10 of the first stage such was the social optimum solution for many of the 
players. In no single occasion such solution was questioned, although we did allowed participants to make 
questions before stage 2 begun. 26 
 
Exit stage (Calculate earnings, fill out survey): 
After all rounds from stage 2 end, the monitors calculated total earnings for each player by adding the 
column of round earnings and subtracting the cases where a fine was imposed. While the monitor made 
the calculations, the players responded the exit survey anonymously and in private. Then payments 
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